Japanese Americans in the Interior West

On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which allowed U.S. military commanders to designate military areas as “exclusion zones” from which “any or all persons may be excluded.” This action came two and a half months after Japan’s December 7, 1941, attack upon Pearl Harbor—the U.S. naval station in the Territory of Hawaii then home to the main part of the American fleet—which precipitated the United States’s entry into World War II.

Although it did not specifically mention Japanese Americans, E.O. 9066 led to the decision by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the Western Defense Command head, to exclude people of Japanese ancestry—both Issei (Japan-born aliens ineligible for American naturalization) and native-born Nisei, who were U.S. citizens—from California, the western halves of Washington and Oregon, and southern Arizona. Of the roughly 127,000 pre-World War II U.S. Nikkei (Japanese Americans), two-thirds were U.S. citizens and the overwhelming majority lived in the three excluded states bordering the Pacific Ocean. Approximately 94,000 Nikkei resided in California.

Initially, General DeWitt opted for “voluntary” resettlement: this allowed the “excluded” Nikkei to move—at their own expense—to any unrestricted area in the country. As a result, 1,963 people moved to Colorado, 1,519 to Utah, 305 to Idaho, 208 to eastern Washington, 115 to eastern Oregon, 105 to northern Arizona, 83 to Wyoming, 72 to Illinois, 69 to Nebraska, and 166 to other states (including New Mexico and Texas). There were many other potential refugees, however, who were thwarted in their attempts to move inland by the unwillingness of some states to accept them, difficulties in obtaining lodging and automobile fuel on route to their destinations, and upon their arrival, hostile “No Japs Wanted” “reception” committees, both public and private.

Consider the case of Clarence Iwao Nishizu, a 31-year-old Orange County (California) Nisei farmer. Having decided in early March 1942 that he preferred to have his family voluntarily move out of California and resettle inland, he drove his recently purchased 1941 Chevrolet to Colorado to check out possibilities there; he was accom-

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panied by a younger brother, John, and a longtime Nisei friend, Jack Tsuhara. They were well aware that Colorado—thanks to the courageous civil libertarian commitments of its governor, Ralph Carr—and Utah (to a lesser extent) were the only western states willing to have excluded Japanese American citizens become residents.②

As restricted citizens under curfew on the Pacific Coast, the Orange County Nisei trio was required to carry travel permits, and they were not allowed to be out any later than eight o’clock in the evening. Before their early morning departure from southern California, they had heard rumors that no gas would be sold to Japanese travelers. After passing through Las Vegas on their first evening on the road, they were obliged to test the veracity of these rumors in the gateway southwestern Utah city of St. George. There, practically out of fuel, they stopped at the first filling station they encountered. It was closed, but when they saw someone sleeping inside the station they knocked on the door, and were greeted by a tough, burly man toting a shotgun, who growled: “What do you want?” To which Jack Tsuhara replied, “We’re out of gas, can you sell us some?” Surprisingly, the man responded in the affirmative. Relieved, and now with a full tank of gas, the pilgrims drove to Salt Lake City, via Vernal, Utah, where they bought alcohol for the car’s radiator to prevent it from freezing.

It was after midnight when the Nisei travelers crossed the state line into Colorado, after which they drove past Steamboat Springs up to the 12,000-foot summit of the Rockies. There it was snowing, a cold wind was blowing, and the temperature was 35 degrees below zero—and the water in the car’s radiator had completely boiled out. While the men initially contemplated filling the radiator with tea, they ultimately rejected this plan due to the tea’s high tannic acid content. Instead, they used a roadside cedar post to make a fire and so were able to melt snow for radiator water. With that problem solved, they continued their Colorado journey to Loveland and then on to Denver. There they succumbed in the early morning to their desperate need for sleep, only to be awakened by a policeman who inquired what they were doing sleeping in their car in the daytime. They replied, “Getting some rest after driving all night from California.”

Fortified with a letter of introduction from a produce shipper back home in southern California, the three Nisei went to see the head of a seed company in Littleton, a town south of Denver, and he kindly offered to let them stay at his home. After looking around Littleton, however, they realized that there was little hope of their families establishing a footing in that community. They then traveled to San Luis, Colorado’s oldest city, in search of suitable agricultural property to farm, but there they found nothing but alkaline soil, so they drove on to La Jara, a town near the Colorado/New Mexico border, to meet with one of the oldest pioneer Issei farmers in the state. Already reluctant to accommodate Nikkei “outsiders,” this patriarch apparently used the pretext of an earthy utterance by Clarence Nishizu, made in earshot of several of his ten daughters, to refrain from even inviting the three travelers into his home to discuss resettlement prospects.

After a visit to the alien internment center in Santa Fe, New Mexico, to visit Issei relatives and family friends detained there, the three Nisei drove south to Las Cruces. There they met an Issei who was farming chilies—the crop their own families grew in the world’s chili capital, Orange County, California. Known as the “chili king” of Las Cruces, this Issei obviously feared potential competition and so offered his Nisei visitors no encouragement whatsoever to resettle in his area. Before leaving New Mexico, the threesome traveled west to Deming, a town they left in a hurry after an incident in a bar: an edgy local drinker inquired as to whether they were Chinese or Japanese, explaining, ominously, that “I can’t tell the difference between a [good] Chinese and a bad Jap.” Going next to El Paso, Texas, they met with yet another unfriendly reception, this time from the staff of the Chinese restaurant where they stopped to

② For a full assessment of Governor Ralph Carr’s actions in relation to Japanese Americans during World War II, consult the biographical study by Adam Schrager, The Principled Politician: The Ralph Carr Story (Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum, 2008).
eat. Following a meal punctuated by shouts from the restaurant’s noticeably agitated personnel, the Nisei returned to their car, only to be menaced by the sight of a knife placed under a tire in order to puncture it.

Clearly it was time to return to California, but even as they attempted to get home the group met with further degradation. Driving through Chandler, Arizona, they were stopped by a state highway patrolman. After informing the Nikkei travelers that they were in a restricted zone, the lawman reminded them that there was a curfew in effect and asked if they possessed an authorized travel permit. When Jack Tsuchara flashed the obligatory document for inspection, the patrolman then patronizingly announced that they were headed in the wrong direction and smugly corrected their mistake.

In May of 1942, Clarence Nishizu's family was detained first at the Pomona Assembly Center on the site of the Los Angeles County Fairgrounds; in August 1942 they were moved to the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in northwestern Wyoming. At the time, almost all of the nearly 2,000 Nikkei in Orange County had been evicted from their homes and were incarcerated at the large concentration camp called Poston Relocation Center, located on Colorado River Indian tribal land in southwestern Arizona. After being declared ineligible for military service, in 1944 Clarence resettled with his wife, Helen, and their two young daughters in Caldwell, Idaho (near Boise), where he worked hauling potatoes. Around the same time, his parents and his two brothers, John and Henry, resettled in Ordway, Colorado, where they attempted to farm, unsuccessfully, on leased land. During the winter of 1945, with the West Coast now reopened to Japanese Americans, the entire Nishizu clan returned to southern California.

The Nishizu family’s story of “relocation” and “resettlement” is only one among thousands of parallel versions involving other Japanese American mainlanders—true a “people in motion” —during the World War II era. It is of particular value, however, because it spotlights and invites strategic exploration of a largely neglected aspect of Japanese American history, society, and culture: the prewar, wartime, and postwar circumstances of Nikkei communities within what historians Eric Walz and Andrew Russell have styled the Interior West of Japanese America. This essay will examine this topic in some depth, placing special emphasis upon the enduring historical experience of Japanese Americans living in the states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah. By exploring these lesser-known stories, we achieve a broader and more multidimensional understanding of the Japanese American experience as a whole and give a voice to those communities that have always existed but have often been pushed to the margins in accounts of the more mainstream West Coast Japanese American communities.

In addition to touching upon the five states mentioned above, the Nishizu narrative mentions three other western interior states: Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming. These eight states—as well as Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, North

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3 See Clarence Iwao Nishizu, interview by Arthur A. Hansen, June 14, 1982, interview 5b, Japanese American Oral History Project, Oral History Program [Center for Oral and Public History], California State University, Fullerton. This interview was published as a bound volume (edited, illustrated, and indexed) in 1991 by the CSUF Oral History Program. For the resettlement narrative featured here, see pp. 142-44.


5 My intention here is to avoid, as much as possible, replicating information about these five states that the Enduring Communities project state scholars—Karen Leong and Dan Kil Loren (Arizona); Daryl J. Maeda (Colorado); Andrew B. Russell (New Mexico); Thomas Walls (Texas); and Nancy J. Taniguchi (Utah)—have provided in their respective essays, included in this curriculum and written from a multicultural perspective.
Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota—can be perceived in the present context as constituting the Interior West region. (This categorization is useful despite the fact that these states range over a number of variably designated geographical subregions: Pacific Northwest, Southwest, Intermountain, Great Plains, and Midwest.)

One notable commonality between these fourteen states is their relatively large geographical size. This point is dramatized by their rankings in total area among the 50 U.S. states. These states also are alike in that they have comparatively small total populations. Another common denominator for the 14 Interior West states is their comparatively small Asian American population relative to the national average of 3.6 percent (according to the 2000 U.S. census). In terms of the racial-ethnic population (Asian/Black/American Indian/Hispanic) of the Interior West, however, it is apparent that a noticeable disparity in this regard exists between the five principal states and the nine subsidiary states when the percentages for the two units are compared to the national average percentage of 29.3.

When Clarence Nishizu and his party explored resettlement possibilities in the Interior West in early 1942, the demographic profile for the area’s 14 states (based on 1940 census information and arrayed in alphabetical order) reveals the following total and racial-ethnic population figures: Arizona (499,261 - 174,377); Colorado (1,123,296 - 109,343); Idaho (524,873 - 8,300); Kansas (1,801,028 - 79,571); Montana (559,456 - 21,228); Nebraska (1,315,834 - 23,705); Nevada (110,247 - 9,263); New Mexico (531,818 - 261,387); North Dakota (641,935 - 10,791); Oklahoma (2,336,434 - 232,629); South Dakota (642,961 - 24,206); Texas (6,414,824 - 1,663,712); Utah (550,310 - 9,962); Wyoming (250,742 - 10,273). As for the Interior West Nikkei population at the point of the U.S. entry into World War II, it was distributed as follows: Arizona (632); Colorado (2,734); Idaho (1,200); Kansas (19); Montana (508); Nevada (470); New Mexico (186); North Dakota (83); Oklahoma (57); South Dakota (19); Texas (458); Utah (2,210); and Wyoming (643). Even in 1940, all fourteen Interior West states could claim enduring com-

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6 Rankings in terms of area: Texas (2); Montana (4); New Mexico (5); Arizona (6); Nevada (7); Colorado (8); Wyoming (10); Utah (13); Idaho (44); Kansas (15); Nebraska (6); South Dakota (17); North Dakota (19); Oklahoma (20).
7 Rankings in terms of population size: Wyoming (50); North Dakota (47); South Dakota (46); Montana (44); Idaho (39); Nebraska (38); New Mexico (16); Nevada (35); Utah (34); Kansas (33); Oklahoma (27); Colorado (24); Arizona (20); Texas (21). The last three of these states (Colorado, Arizona, and Texas), observably, are exceptional in that their present-day population ranking falls within the upper half of the nation’s fifty states. However, viewed historically, only Texas claimed such a ranking in the six national censuses extending from 1910 to 1960: 1910 (5); 1920 (5); 1930 (5); 1940 (6); 1950 (6); 1960 (6). As for Arizona, its population rankings differed markedly, with a population loss from the early part of the twentieth century until 1960: 1910 (45); 1920 (45); 1930 (43); 1940 (43); 1950 (37); 1960 (35). Colorado’s ranking during this time period changed very little: 1910 (18); 1920 (18); 1930 (18); 1940 (18); 1950 (14); 1960 (13). When looked at another way, it can be appreciated that Colorado’s population increased by a robust 30.6 percent between 1950 and 2000, while Arizona’s grew by a whopping 40 percent.
8 This is certainly true of the five principal states: Arizona (1.8 percent); Colorado (2.2 percent); New Mexico (1.1 percent); Texas (2.7 percent); and Utah (1.7 percent). But this point applies (with one obvious exception) even more powerfully to the nine other states: North Dakota (0.6 percent); South Dakota (0.6 percent); Nebraska (1.1 percent); Nevada (4.5 percent); Kansas (1.7 percent); Oklahoma (1.4 percent); Wyoming (0.6 percent); Montana (0.5 percent); and Idaho (0.9 percent).
9 On the one hand, all but Nevada (32.3) of the latter states fall beneath this percentage (and most substantially so): North Dakota (6.1 percent); South Dakota (10.9 percent); Nebraska (11.7 percent); Kansas (15.3 percent); Oklahoma (20.1 percent); Wyoming (10.1 percent); Montana (9.0 percent); Idaho (10.6 percent). On the other hand, three of the five former states exceed (two quite strikingly) the national average percentage: Arizona (35.2 percent); Colorado (24.4 percent); New Mexico (54.6 percent); Texas (46.0 percent); Utah (12.8 percent).
10 Because the primary focus in this essay is on the five states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah, the statistics for these states are rendered in bold type.
Japanese Americans in the Interior West

communities, however modest, of Nikkei living and working within their boundaries.\textsuperscript{11} In 1900 there were a total of 5,278 Japanese Americans living in the 14 Interior West states, with 767 of them residing in the primary five states and 4,509 in the supplementary nine states. By 1940, the total number of Nikkei in the Interior West had grown to 9,624—but their distribution in the primary and supplementary states had almost reversed itself: the five primary states now counted 6,220 as opposed to the nine states’ 3,404 Nikkei. What accounts for this transformed situation?

The work of the late Nisei historian Masakazu Iwata—in particular, his book \textit{Planted in Good Soil: A History of the Issei in United States Agriculture}—is especially helpful in explaining the population numbers above.\textsuperscript{12} Because Iwata’s focus is on Japanese immigrants who came to the U.S. mainland after 1884 when Japan began allowing general emigration of laborers to foreign countries, he only alludes to the 61,111 Japanese who were living in the Hawaiian Islands by 1900, by and large toiling on the many sugar plantations there. For Iwata, what is notable is that between 1902 and 1907 37,000 Japanese migrated to the continental U.S., where they joined the 80,000 who had arrived directly on the mainland between 1893 and 1910; these numbers were augmented by thousands of their fellow countrymen who indirectly entered the U.S., legally and illegally, from Canada and Mexico.\textsuperscript{13}

Whether journeying directly to the U.S. mainland or via Hawai‘i, most Japanese immigrants landed at the West Coast ports of Seattle and San Francisco. While some people settled proximate to these cities, many more fanned out to other parts of the West. “In contrast to the westward migration across the American continent of immigrants from Europe after their landing in Atlantic coast ports,” observes Iwata, “those from Japan pushed eastward from the Pacific Coast, their progress generally coming to a halt roughly at the Missouri River in the Nebraska sector, [while] in the south the farthest advance eastward was into the Rio Grande Valley of Texas.”\textsuperscript{14}

These overwhelmingly unmarried male Issei were drawn to the U.S. primarily for economic reasons. Most came from agrarian backgrounds in southern Japan and—despite the fact that they were preponderantly common laborers—most were relatively well-educated. As compared to those in this immigrant wave with a sojourner mentality (i.e., who determined to stay abroad only long enough to earn sufficient money to alleviate their Japanese families’ dire financial straits and/or to build lives for themselves in Japan), there was only a very small number who intended to settle permanently in America.

Fortuitously, the Issei arrived in the U.S. as the Interior West region was experiencing what historian Eric Walz has described as “an economic boom fueled by railroad construction, coal and hard-rock mining, and agricultural

\textsuperscript{11} For example, in 1900, at the twentieth century’s outset, the five primary states had these Japanese American populations: Arizona (281); Colorado (417); New Mexico (8); Texas (13); Utah (417). In the three decennial censuses between 1900 and 1940, the almost universally escalating number of Nikkei in these states is captured statistically: Arizona (371 - 550 - 879); Colorado (2,300 - 2,464 - 3,213); New Mexico (258 - 251 - 249); Texas (340 - 449 - 519); Utah (2,100 - 2,936 - 3,269). As for the subsidiary nine states, their Nikkei decade-by-decade populations—recorded in the four U.S. censuses for those decades—from 1900 through 1930 were characterized by a generally fluctuating growth pattern: Idaho (1,263 - 1,369 - 1,429); Kansas (4 - 59 - 804); Montana (2,441 - 1,596 - 1,194); Nebraska (1 - 42 - 38); Nevada (228 - 864 - 754); Oklahoma (0 - 48 - 67); South Dakota (1 - 42 - 38); Wyoming (393 - 1,596 - 1,194).

\textsuperscript{12} Masakazu Iwata, \textit{Planted in Good Soil: A History of the Issei in United States Agriculture}, 2 vols. (New York: Peter Lang, 1992). The two volumes of this work are consecutively numbered.


\textsuperscript{13} Iwata, \textit{Planted in Good Soil}, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Gold, copper, zinc, nickel, lead, etc.
Recruited by labor contractors, the Issei were a mobile workforce. As both individuals and gang laborers, they moved not only between different work opportunities on the Pacific Coast and the western interior sections of the U.S., but also between America and Japan and many other parts of the world in which Japanese workers filled a variety of employment needs. Concurrently, their emigration patterns relieved population pressure on their native Japan, and through remittances, increased its wealth.\(^{16}\)

Many Issei who came to America first found employment with the steam railroad companies in two of the five primary Interior West states, Colorado and Utah, but many more also worked for the railroad industry in such secondary states as Montana, Idaho,\(^{18}\) Wyoming,\(^{19}\) and Nevada.\(^{20}\) This largely accounts for why the 1900 census counted so many more Nikkei in the secondary states rather than the primary states. However, as Iwata notes, even though they achieved remarkable success—supplanting Chinese railroad workers; gaining wage parity with (and then employer preference over) other immigrant laborers from such countries as Italy, Greece, and Austria; improving their status within the industry by becoming section workers (occasionally even foremen) and office secretaries and interpreters; and accumulating some surplus capital—the majority of Issei “began to look about for work other than that in the railroads.”\(^{21}\) Nonetheless, as Masakazu Iwata is quick to remind us, in spite of this exodus of Issei workers from the railroads during the first decade of the twentieth century, “even as late as 1930 there were over 2,000 Japanese still working in the railroad industry.”\(^{22}\) Moreover, as historian Andrew Russell has more recently indicated, “while their numbers shrank steadily in the prewar [World War II years], the Nikkei of the railroads and mines continued to account for a sizable percentage of the Japanese-American population of most interior states right up to the start of the war.”\(^{23}\)

Russell recounts that sometime after going into railroad work, Issei entered into mining operations (albeit to a far lesser extent). While there were outcroppings of Japanese mining settlements in Rock Springs and other

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\(16\) See Eric Walz, “From Kumamoto to Idaho,” p. 405.

\(17\) Remittances were money sent by overseas Japanese laborers to Japan for investment or for family support. Although the largest Issei remittance payments came from Hawaii and California, those sent home by Interior West laborers were also fairly substantial. For example, a 1908 survey of Japanese farmers in Colorado revealed that one-third of them sent annual remittances averaging one hundred dollars.

\(18\) For details about Issei employment in the Pacific Northwest (Montana and Idaho, as well as Washington and Oregon), see William Thomas White, “A History of Railroad Workers in the Pacific Northwest, 1883-1934” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1981) and “Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Railroad Work Force: The Case of the Far Northwest, 1883-1918,” \textit{Western Historical Quarterly} 16 (July 1985): 265-83, especially pp. 273-76. In “Race, Ethnicity, and Gender,” White explains that most of the peak 13,000 Issei workers on western railroads were in the pay of the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, the Southern Pacific, Union Pacific, and Milwaukee lines, with the Great Northern alone employing 5,000 of them, “although their number declined rapidly in the wake of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907-1908” (p. 274).

\(19\) For an in-depth treatment of Nikkei railway employment within Wyoming, see Barbara Hickman, “Japanese Railroad Workers in Wyoming, 1891-1941” (master’s thesis, University of Wyoming, 1989). Hickman emphasizes that her study concentrates on “the Japanese who worked for the Union Pacific, both on the tracks and in its related industries across the southern tier of Wyoming, and along the Oregon Short Line northwest from Kemmerer in the southwest of the state” (p. 1).

\(20\) For a brief overview of pre-World War II Issei railroad workers in Nevada, see Andrew Russell, “Friends, Neighbors, Foes and Invaders: Conflicting Images and Experiences of Japanese Americans in Wartime Nevada” (master’s thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1996), pp. 21-24. In “American Dreams Derailed: Japanese Railroad and Mine Communities of the Interior West” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2003), Russell broadens his 1996 treatment of Issei railroad workers to embrace the Interior West region. After stating that in 1905 one-sixth of the Issei (11,783 out of 61,338) worked for railroads, he writes that initially most worked as trackmen in the northwestern and central mountain states. “However,” he concludes, “by 1906 the number of railroad workers had climbed to between 13,000 and 15,000 dispersed along virtually all of the major roads of the West. Thereafter, the ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ went into effect, causing a sharp decrease in Japanese railway workers by 1910. . . . The Union Pacific and other roads that traversed Wyoming, which once employed thousands, by then reported between 600 and 800 Japanese workers” (pp. 15-16).

\(21\) In the peak year of 1906, some 13,000 Issei worked for the railroads.


\(23\) See Russell, “American Dreams Derailed,” p. 3.
southern Wyoming towns in the late 1890s, most Japanese immigrants did not labor in coal and copper mining camps until the first decade of the twentieth century. “The first Japanese coal miners in Utah,” surmises Russell, “probably arrived in 1904, when 145 hired on at the Castle Gate Mine in Carbon County . . . [and] around this time, coal mining companies in southern Colorado and northern New Mexico also began to employ significant numbers of Japanese miners.”

It is the opinion of Masakazu Iwata that Japanese working in the coal mines of Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah experienced harsher treatment than did Issei laborers in the coal mining industry within Wyoming, where they were more numerous than in the other three states. Although Issei miners in Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah avoided wage discrimination and were paid roughly the same as other immigrant groups, they typically were disallowed union membership and were consigned to live in a “Jap Town” outside of the boundaries of a given community settlement; they were also regarded by other races and ethnic groups to be in the same category as blacks. Wyoming—which in 1909 was home for over 13 percent of the total 7,000 Japanese living in the Interior West region—permitted Nikkei (and Chinese) to become members of the United Mine Workers, and this development led to a shortened work day and higher wages for Asian workers compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the region.

Barbara Hickman, a historian of the Nikkei experience in Wyoming, has observed that by 1909 the Issei residents of that state were increasingly finding the conditions of railroad and mining life too harsh. At the same time, they began to shift their goals: rather than continue to live in deprivation in order to save money and then return to Japan, they sought to become permanent settlers in America. “For those who stayed in the U.S.,” writes Hickman, “savings went towards the establishment of small businesses and family farms. Issei, for the most part, quit the perilous railroad and mining industries by 1910 and [thereafter steadily] moved away from the state of Wyoming.”

In her work, Hickman seeks to rectify the fact that historians of Wyoming history have tended to restrict their treatment of the Japanese experience in the so-called “Equality State” to their World War II incarceration at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center (whose peak population reached 10,767); the camp was located in the northwestern corner of the state between the small communities of Powell and Cody. Wyoming’s population of people of Japanese ancestry did decline from a 1910 figure of 1,596 (1.09 percent of the state’s total population of 145,965) to 1,194 in 1920 and 1,026 in 1930, dropping somewhat precipitously to 643 in 1940. Despite these falling numbers, Hickman does not feel that this justifies the fact that “the Japanese [have] quietly disappeared” from Wyoming’s

**References**

24 Ibid., 16. Nancy Taniguchi, in Castle Valley America: Hard Land, Hard-won Home (Logan, Utah: Utah State University Press, 2004), places the arrival of the first Japanese miners in Castle Valley, Utah, in 1901, when they replaced Italian immigrants in the multinational, multicultural, and semi-segregated workforce. In Planted in Good Soil, Masakazu Iwata maintains that “it was not until 1903 that the members of this race [Japanese] entered the mines of southern Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah, at which time they were introduced as strikebreakers” (p. 127). For a detailed historical treatment of the experience of Japanese miners within the multicultural coal industry of southern Wyoming, see Ellen Schoening Aiken, “The United Mine Workers of America Moves West: Race, Working Class Formation, and the Discourse of Cultural Diversity in the Union Pacific Coal Towns of Southern Wyoming, 1870-1930” (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 2002).


26 This nickname for Wyoming—bestowed because in 1869 it became the first place in the U.S. where women were granted the right to vote—is a bit of a misnomer: in 1869 Wyoming was still a territory and did not become the nation’s forty-fourth state until 1890.

27 The literature on the Heart Mountain Relocation Center is voluminous. The most comprehensive nonfiction studies are Douglas W. Nelson’s Heart Mountain: The History of an American Concentration Camp (Madison, Wisc.: State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1976) and Mike Mackey’s Heart Mountain: Life in Wyoming’s Concentration Camp (Powell, Wyo.: Western History Publications, 2000). In addition, Gretel Ehrlich’s Heart Mountain (New York: Viking, 1988) represents an overview of this camp’s wartime experience from the perspective of a historical novelist. At present, there is no book extant that examines the overarching history of people of Japanese ancestry in Wyoming.
historical record. To make her point, she not only references the existence of pre-1910 communities in Wyoming with a considerable population of Issei, but also documents those towns—such as Rock Springs in south central Wyoming—that boasted nihonmachi (japantowns).

Montana shares Wyoming’s historical experience of having had a sizeable Nikkei population at the outset of the twentieth century that thereafter dwindled in the decades prior to World War II. In 1900 Montana’s Japanese population was 2,441, which then spiraled downward: 1,585 in 1910, 1,074 in 1920, 753 in 1930, and 508 in 1940; this drop was even more dramatic than the Nikkei population numbers in Wyoming. During World War II, the U.S. Department of Justice operated the Fort Missoula Internment Camp for enemy alien Italians and roughly 1,000 Japanese internees. Unfortunately, the camp’s existence and its place within the context of Japanese America’s defining event—wartime exclusion and detention—has seemingly overshadowed all other facets of the Nikkei experience from Montana’s historical narrative and collective memory.

The two-pronged cause prompting the mass exodus of Issei railroad and mining gang laborers from Wyoming and Montana was their desire to pursue agricultural employment as well as the comparative paucity of opportunities to do so within these neighboring states. Wyoming suffered the most dismal agricultural scenario; subject to extremely cold temperatures and generally considered to be semi-arid, it was “climatologically inhospitable to farming.” According to Masakazu Iwata, while the great majority of Issei immigrants were toiling in the railroad and mining industries in the southwestern part of the state, in northern Wyoming a much smaller number took

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28 “Of all the ethnic groups attracted to southwestern Wyoming by employment opportunities in the coal mines and the railroad,” explains Hickman, “the Japanese immigrants are arguably least recognized. Few studies of cultural diversity in Wyoming even mention the presence of Japanese, choosing to focus on the European immigrants.” See, Hickman, “Japanese Railroad Workers in Wyoming,” p. 52.

29 Rock Springs, Wyoming, was the site of the Rock Springs massacre on September 2, 1885. The result of racial tensions between immigrant Chinese and white (primarily immigrant) miners growing out of an ongoing labor dispute, this event ended with at least 28 Chinese miners dead and another 15 wounded, plus property damage that included 75 Chinese residences burned.

30 Drawing upon oral history evidence provided by a 14-year-old who was living in Rock Springs in 1907, Hickman notes that its Japantown—then consisting of 272 people—had “two Japanese pool halls, two Japanese professional photographers, grocery and fish stores, a noodle restaurant, and a regular restaurant.” Its residents staged a public parade to celebrate the Meiji emperor of Japan’s birthday. Moreover, while conceding that most of the post-1910 Japanese-ancestry population in Wyoming continued to be connected to the railroad and mining industries, Hickman relates that with growing frequency Nikkei entered a wide range of occupations. See Hickman, “Japanese Railroad Workers in Wyoming,” pp. 2, 32, and 42.


As in the case in Montana, the placement of an enemy alien internment camp near Bismarck, North Dakota, during World War II (Fort Lincoln, whose Japanese-ancestry population numbered more than 1,800) has resulted in this one momentous chapter of the Japanese experience in North Dakota so overshadowing the rest of the state’s Nikkei story as to render it practically nonexistent. Whereas diverse dimensions of Fort Lincoln’s wartime situation have been featured in a book (Hyung-ju Ahn, Between Two Adversaries: Korean Interpreters at Japanese Alien Enemy Detention Centers during World War II [Fullerton, Calif.: Oral History Program at California State University, Fullerton, 2002]); a museum exhibition (Snow Country Prison: Interned in North Dakota, curated by Laurel Reuter and exhibited in Bismarck, North Dakota, at United Tribes Technical College, 2003); and a documentary film (Satsuki Ina, producer/co-director, From A Silk Cocoon: A Japanese American Renunciation Story [San Francisco: Center for Asian American Media, 2005]), there are no media representations whatsoever of any other aspects of the Japanese historical presence in North Dakota.


up farming in the Powell and Worland districts and around the town of Sheridan.\textsuperscript{35} Most of the farmers remaining in Wyoming after 1910 found work as gang laborers in the northern sugar beet fields, although the majority of Issei agricultural workers migrated to such nearby Interior West states as Colorado, Nebraska, and, in particular, Idaho, for employment in those states’ respective sugar beet operations.\textsuperscript{36}

The Japanese agricultural story in Montana, as Iwata has recorded, played out differently from that in Wyoming—and the primary factor in that difference was not climate, but racism. Very early in the twentieth century, as Japanese immigrant railroad workers began to seek other employment (due in part to the hostility they encountered from white laborers), they were recruited to work on labor gangs in the state’s burgeoning sugar beet industry. By 1907 Issei had gained invaluable experience farming sugar beets, and they began raising this crop on land they controlled either as owners, or more generally, as leaseholders; most of these farms were located in south-central Montana, just north of Wyoming’s border, around communities like Joliet, Park City, Bridger, and Fromberg. Shortly after World War I (which swelled Montana farm profits), Issei farmers began growing other crops (e.g., potatoes, melons, onions, and cabbage) as well as sugar beets. Issei also launched farming ventures in northwest Montana near the town of Whitefish, with some cultivating crops previously deemed not feasible for the area (such as celery and lettuce), and some abandoned vegetable production altogether for dairy farming. By 1923, anti-Asian sentiments were formalized in the form of an alien land law modeled on the one imposed in California; its strict enforcement both prohibited white landowners from leasing farmland to aliens ineligible for citizenship (i.e., Japanese and Korean immigrants) and persuaded many Issei to either stop farming in Montana or move, as many of their compatriots already had, to more accommodating Interior West states (in particular, Utah, Colorado, Nebraska, and Idaho)\textsuperscript{37} and there pursue their agricultural aspirations.\textsuperscript{38}

The history of the sugar beet industry in the Interior West is too complicated to be discussed in much detail here,\textsuperscript{39} but since it was of paramount importance to the frontier and settlement stages of Nikkei in this region, a few basic facts are in order. (Thankfully, Masakasu Iwata has admirably tackled how and to what extent the sugar beet industry influenced the development of Nikkei agriculture and community building in not only Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah,\textsuperscript{40} but also in such other Interior West states as Arizona, Kansas, Montana, New Mex-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Hickman, “Japanese Railroad Workers in Wyoming,” p. 33.
\item Thus, all four of these states experienced increased Japanese populations between 1910 and 1920—Colorado, 2,100 to 2,464; Idaho, 1,263 to 1,569; Nebraska, 590 to 804; Utah, 2,100 to 2,956—even after the passage of the 1908 Gentlemen’s Agreement, by which the Japanese government agreed to limit issuance of continental passports to non-laborers; former residents; parents, wives, or children of residents; or settled agriculturists (i.e., those who wished to assume active control of an already possessed interest in a mainland farming enterprise). See Hickman, “Japanese Railroad Workers in Wyoming,” p. 47.
\item The information about Japanese farming in Montana is drawn from Iwata, \textit{Planted in Good Soil}, pp. 605-07.
\item For a discussion about Colorado, see Iwata, \textit{Planted In Good Soil}, pp. 634-69, especially pp. 634-45 and 661-63; for Idaho, see ibid., pp. 615-24, especially pp. 616 and 622-24; for Nebraska, see ibid., pp. 607-614, especially p. 609; and for Utah, see ibid., pp. 595-604, especially pp. 595-99, 601, and 603-04.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The research and development phase of the industry—which primarily took place in Utah under the guidance of Mormon Church agricultural supervisors—was effectively completed by 1897; between 1898 and 1920, abetted by irrigation practices and the securing of sufficient labor throughout the region, the industry experienced tremendous expansion. Working in labor gangs, thousands of Issei dominated the handwork done in the regional sugar beet fields during the twentieth century’s opening decade. (As succinctly described by Masakazu Iwata, in *Planted in Good Soil,* “handwork” in the sugar beet fields consisted of “the bunching and thinning, the arduous hoeing, and the back-breaking work of topping and loading.”) By about 1920, however, most sugar beet hand laborers were Mexican immigrants. This change occurred because Issei bachelors began to nurture a family-based Nikkei society here in the United States, in part due to both the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908 and the Immigration Act of 1924; they began to marry and bring relatives over from Japan. As Eric Walz writes, they “chose to move as quickly as possible from the ranks of the common laborer to operating their own farms and businesses.”

Not all Issei laborers who exchanged railroad and mining employment for agricultural pursuits in the Interior West migrated to this region from within the continental U.S., nor did these migrants always enter farming in their new locations via the sugar beet industry. One way of giving these abstract points concrete embodiment is through examining a case study, that of the Japanese experience in El Paso, Texas. Invaluable to this case study is the unpublished work on the same subject: John L. Powell, “The Role of Beet Growers in the Cache Valley Sugar Beet Industry 1891-1981 (master’s thesis, Utah State University, 1995). Whereas the books by Arrington, Bachman, and Taylor are written, as their titles may indicate, from the perspective of the sugar companies, Powell’s thesis generally embodies the point of view of the white, Mormon beet growers. As for Welker’s thesis, it approaches the topic from the frame of reference of two racial-ethnic groups—Japanese/Japanese Americans and Mexicans/Mexican Americans—involuted within a single sugar beet farming community in northern Utah.

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41 The situation in Arizona is discussed in ibid., pp. 672-701, particularly pp. 674-75; for Kansas, see ibid., pp. 644-15; for Montana, see ibid., pp. 605-07; for Nevada, see ibid., pp. 624-26; for New Mexico, see ibid., pp. 701-08, particularly pp. 702-03; for South Dakota, see ibid., p. 775; for Texas, see ibid., pp. 717-41, particularly pp. 734-35; and for Wyoming, see ibid., pp. 604-05. Of the 14 Interior West states, Iwata fails to mention only Oklahoma and North Dakota relative to the Japanese role in sugar beet agriculture. However, he does state that “in the Dakotas, statistics indicate that the Japanese population in North Dakota was from the earliest years greater than that of South Dakota because of the entry of railroad, mine, and farm workers from the neighboring state of Montana” (ibid., p. 755).

42 Historian Leonard Arrington observes that in the 1898-1913 interval, a total of 86 new beet factories were built, more than half by 1903, involving an $80 million investment (“Science, Government, and Enterprise in Economic Development,” p. 10). In “Japanese Settlement in the Intermountain West” Eric Walz, being more pointed, writes that in the states of “Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah, sugar beet acreage expanded from a total of 168,425 acres in 1910, to 506,200 acres in 1920 [and that] the number of sugar factories in those same four states increased from ten in 1900, to forty-nine in 1920, while the total tonnage of sugar beets produced . . . grew from 39,385 tons in 1901 to 4,779,00 tons in 1920” (p. 2).


44 This change occurred because Issei bachelors began to nurture a family-based Nikkei society here in the United States, in part due to both the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908 and the Immigration Act of 1924; they began to marry and bring relatives over from Japan. As Eric Walz writes, they “chose to move as quickly as possible from the ranks of the common laborer to operating their own farms and businesses.”

45 Walz, “From Kumamoto to Idaho,” pp. 408-09.


Most Issei migrants to El Paso, the largest city along the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border, traveled either from Mexico or from diverse parts of the continental United States. After experiencing difficulty entering America from Mexico during 1906-1907, owing to widespread fears in the U.S. of a so-called “Japanese Invasion,” Issei laborers resorted to smuggling themselves across the border into El Paso, where Texas officials welcomed them because of their reputed agricultural expertise. When the Mexican Revolution erupted in 1910, the United States suspended its immigration laws in order to provide Nikkei refuge from Mexico. Thereafter, the refugees—primarily ex-railroad laborers in Mexico—formed the cornerstone of a small yet flourishing Japanese colony in El Paso.

Texas did not impose an anti-Japanese alien land law until 1921, so prior to that date the Japanese population in the city and the surrounding valley of El Paso grew steadily as Nikkei farmers availed themselves of the twin opportunities to farm their own land and to become permanent settlers. The first Issei to purchase land in El Paso did so in 1914, and just two years later El Paso had 44 Japanese residents. By 1920 Issei farmed—mainly as leaseholders—one-fifth of El Paso Valley’s 50,000 acres of fertile land, and by the next year there were 125 Japanese who owned 70 acres and leased another 5,000 acres proximate to the city. Cantaloupes were the chief crop, although it later suffered devastation by nematodes (i.e., roundworms).

A number of Issei men who came to El Paso not only married Mexican women, but they also adopted Spanish first names; thus, Ryiochi Okubo became José Okubo. During the 1930s, the El Paso Nikkei population swelled due to those who moved to Texas to escape the unbearable racism leveled against those of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast and in Mexico. Then, too, in the 1930s, as the actions of the fascist Japanese government became manifest in the media, some Japanese El Pasoans sought to protect themselves by changing their Japanese surnames to Mexican ones.\footnote{See Armendariz, “Inconspicuous but Estimable Immigrants,” pp. 18-44 passim.} Of the 38 Nikkei who made El Paso their home during World War II, the majority escaped confinement in concentration camps, while El Paso Valley’s mainstream population and their organizations refrained from publicly demanding the wholesale removal of its Japanese-ancestry residents. When the war ended, however, the Japanese in El Paso became the victims of racial hatred, and this persecution drove many to move to other parts of the U.S.\footnote{See ibid., 105-15 passim.}

Unlike Armendariz, who chiefly builds her account of El Paso’s early Nikkei community from local newspaper articles, Miyasato relies heavily upon oral history interviews to construct her community narrative. Because these life stories provide a window through which to apprehend the special character of the Japanese El Pasoans and the complex ways they became embedded in the history, culture, and society of the Interior West region, they merit careful attention. The following representative sample focuses on Mansaku Kurita, an Issei man, but it also captures his Issei wife Teru’s experiences.
Around 1910, Mansaku Kurita came to El Paso through Mexico. He once worked for the railroad company, [and] then he started farming in Colorado. . . . In Colorado, he was in real good shape financially, but he got wiped out when his crops failed, so his friend Kuniji Tashiro called him in 1928 to come to New Mexico and farm there for a year. Then he came to El Paso. By the time he settled down in El Paso, he was financially secure. Mansaku married Teru, a woman from Shizuoka [Japan], who was about five years younger than he. When Mansaku called for Teru, she lived in Kansas. Teru had a college education and taught school in Japan. Later she worked as a midwife to many Mexicans in El Paso, and was known as the mother of El Paso.50

For Nikkei, life in Arizona pre-World War II and during the war was markedly different from that in Colorado in important respects. By 1910 Colorado had some 2,500 Japanese immigrants, while fewer than 400 people of Japanese ancestry resided in Arizona; by 1940 Colorado claimed close to 3,225 Nikkei and Arizona nearly 900. The prewar distribution of these two states’ Nikkei populations was also very different. Most Japanese Coloradans were scattered around their state in modest-sized farming communities; there was also a comparatively dense cluster in the area of Denver, where they were supported by the budding Japantown located within the city’s deteriorated core. In contrast, Japanese Arizonans—who were primarily agriculturalists—congregated in the Salt River Valley’s Maricopa County, in central Arizona, where they found rudimentary ethnic support systems in Phoenix, Glendale, Tempe, and Mesa.

Another distinguishing feature differentiating life for Japanese in Arizona and Colorado during this era is that Nikkei in Arizona had to contend with a greater degree of legal and extralegal prejudice, discrimination, and outright racism than those residing in Colorado. This is not to say that Colorado’s anti-Japanese climate was mild or sporadic—in fact, it was both severe and unremitting, as historian Kara Miyagishima has copiously documented. In the early twentieth century, because Colorado’s laboring class generally viewed “little yellow men” from the Far East to be “invading” their state and, as railroad, mining, and farm workers, they were felt to be posing unfair employment competition. To counter this perceived problem, labor groups excluded them by creating associations such as the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League founded by the Colorado State Federation of Labor in 1908. Even after the Issei bachelors progressively transformed the Nikkei population within Colorado from one dominated by mobile laborers with a bird-of-passage mentality to one characterized by stabilized family-based farm and commercial enterprises, nativist groups organized against the Nikkei to hinder their ascent of the social and economic ladder. “Like the Negroes of the South,” writes Miyagishima, “the Japanese were accepted without rancor only so long as they remained in their place.” In Denver, where by 1920 some 85 percent of the population

50 Miyasato, “The Japanese in the El Paso Region,” p. 21. Although the names in this mini-biography were rendered in the Japanese mode—family names preceding given names—they have been reversed to reflect the American naming style.

Miyasato’s study of the Japanese in El Paso does not end with World War II, an event that “fragmented psychologically the small number of Japanese living in the region.” Instead, she reveals how a new El Paso Nikkei community was formed in the post-World War II years by an amalgam of Japanese Americans, Japanese-Mexicans, and Japanese war brides who, during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, came in substantial numbers from Japan (where they met and married American soldiers—including, increasingly, African Americans—stationed there) to live in the El Paso area with their husbands at the nearby Ft. Bliss military base. See ibid., pp. 38 and 38-92 passim, especially 38-53.

51 Kara Mariko Miyagishima, “Colorado’s Nikkei Pioneers: Japanese Americans in Twentieth Century Colorado” (master’s thesis, University of Colorado, Denver), p. 124. Miyagishima’s study and another recent work by the late Bill Hosokawa—Colorado’s Japanese Americans from 1886 to the Present (Boulder, Colo.: University Press of Colorado, 2005)—cover the same general historical territory. However, Hosokawa does so in an episodic, anecdotal, and engagingly colorful and palpable way without benefit of footnotes, while Miyagishima fashions a narrative featuring lineal chronological development, exacting factual detail, contextual amplification, extensive documentation, and clear writing. Accordingly, these two texts very nicely complement one another in style as well as content.
was native-born, restrictive covenants and similar segregating mechanisms were imposed, leaving only the city’s Skid Row area open for residency by Nikkei and other people of color. With the onset of World War II, Colorado—and Denver, in particular—experienced a large infusion of Nikkei from the West Coast. Many arrived in Colorado during the period of “voluntary evacuation” and afterwards, with a large number settling there as a consequence of temporary work leaves and semipermanent resettlement from the WRA camps.

With an increase in Nikkei residents came a sharp increase in anti-Japanese sentiment and activity. The state’s major newspaper, the *Denver Post*, became America’s most venomous journalistic purveyor of Nikkei race-baiting. It pervasively promoted the notion that Japanese Americans “were not genuine U.S. citizens, but unassimilable and untrustworthy,” unacceptable even to harvest the state’s direly endangered sugar beet crop, and altogether unwanted in Colorado without strict federal and military supervision and control. The *Post* also helped to provoke a rising wave of vigilante violence against Nikkei and championed the 1944 campaign mounted for a state constitutional amendment to restrict land ownership by alien Japanese residents (as well as East Indians, Malaysians, and Filipinos).

But the anti-Japanese movement in Colorado, from the early twentieth century through World War II, always had to contend with countervailing forces. Some came from within the Nikkei community, which possessed sufficient numbers to command the Japanese government’s attention and to capitalize upon its considerable international power and influence. Nikkei had also developed an institutional network that could resist—or at least deflect—oppressive measures and campaigns designed to inflict damage upon or destroy Japanese Colorado. Thus, in 1908, to protect the interests of Japanese against the Colorado State Federation of Labor’s Japanese and Korean Exclusion League and similar organizations, the state’s Issei established, in Denver, the Japanese Association of Colorado. Along with other Japanese Association branches that developed throughout Colorado, it concurrently forged political ties to the Japanese government and encouraged the assimilation of Japanese Coloradans. This situation no doubt was a key reason why Colorado, unlike most other Interior West states, did not institute an anti-Japanese alien land law.

Although an attempt was made to do precisely that during World War II—at a point when mainstream negative feeling toward the Nikkei was at its zenith—via a state constitutional amendment, what transpired showed that the Japanese American community could count on countervailing support on its behalf outside the boundaries of its ethnic subculture. In seeking to counteract the drive for the amendment, which was spearheaded by the American League of Colorado in conjunction with such other supporters like the Colorado Veterans of Foreign Wars and citizens of Brighton and Adams counties (most of whom were truck drivers of Italian descent), the Nikkei were aided by a diverse array of backers. Organizations who sided with the Japanese in opposition to the amendment included a Citizens Emergency Committee formed by ministers and educators (with a statewide executive committee made up of prominent citizens), which disseminated its message via public meetings, newspapers, and radio; the Denver Council of Churches; the Denver YWCA; the Colorado State League of Women Voters; the Denver-headquartered National Civic League; the Cosmopolitan Club, a student organization at the University of Colorado; the Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union; and mainstream newspapers like the *Rocky Mountain News* and the *Pueblo Star Journal and Chieftain*, as well as vernacular newspapers such as the *Intermountain Jewish News* and the *Colorado Statesman* and the *Denver Star* (both of which were African American publications). As a result of this diverse
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support, the amendment was defeated.\textsuperscript{54}

The smaller number of Issei in pre-World War II Arizona—as well as the state’s proximity to California, where anti-Japanese emerged earliest and most intensely—made Japanese Arizonaans more vulnerable than Japanese Coloradans to racist mainstream attacks. Thus, as Eric Walz has documented, beginning in 1913, the state’s Nikkei farmers had to contend with the alien land law that Arizona (following California’s lead) passed that year; this law forbade members of racial groups ineligible for U.S. citizenship, which included the Japanese, from purchasing land but did permit them to enter into leasing arrangements.\textsuperscript{55} An attempt was made in 1921 to legally close this loophole, although Issei circumvented the new law by leasing land in their children’s names or through non-Japanese landlords and neighbors. Still, the Issei were swimming against the tide of public opinion, for “non-Japanese farmers in Maricopa County,” to quote Walz, “resented competition from Japanese immigrants . . . and accused the Japanese of using unfair labor practices (Japanese wives and children worked in the fields), of paying too much in rent, and of taking up the best farmland in the [Salt River] valley.”\textsuperscript{56}

In late 1923, the Maricopa County Farm Bureau’s president forwarded Arizona’s governor a Farm Bureau resolution opposing creation of a Japanese population with the potential to “expand in time and prove to be undesirable residents” and requesting “a strict enforcement of the Arizona Statute which forbids the selling to [Japanese] or leasing of farming lands in this state.”\textsuperscript{57} In reply, the governor promised to urge the state attorney general and the county attorneys to strictly enforce the laws. Notwithstanding this official resolve to see that the alien land law’s spirit as well as its letter were respected, the Issei community was “cohesive enough to defend itself”: while Japanese immigration was slowed, “the number of Japanese farm operators in Arizona increased from sixty-nine in 1920 to 121 in 1930.”\textsuperscript{58}

By the early 1930s, with the Depression in full swing, this situation was reversed. In that dire economic climate, the market value of agricultural products was slashed, and a series of circumstances led to Japanese farmers essentially monopolizing cantaloupe production. They also enjoyed a bumper crop that, confronted by very little competition, brought windfall profits even as Maricopa County’s non-Japanese farmers, who had reduced their sideline cantaloupe acreage, were hit by dismal returns for their principal cotton and alfalfa crops. As a consequence, strong anti-Japanese sentiments—including enforcement of the alien land laws—came to the fore once again. The capstone to this escalating racist climate was the explosive situation that Eric Walz has so graphically depicted:

On August 16, 1934, 600 Caucasian farmers met in Glendale to decide how to rid the [Salt River] valley of their Japanese competitors. At a rally the following day, more than 150 cars paraded through town. One carried a banner that read:

\textbf{WE DON’T NEED ASIATICS}
\textbf{JAP MOVING DAY AUGUST 25\textsuperscript{TH}, WE MEAN IT}

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., pp. 177–8. It should be noted, however, that the legislative vote on the measure (the Senate’s narrow victory margin of 15 to 12 and the House’s overwhelming repudiation of 48 to 15) highlighted the prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiment in Colorado.


\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., pp. 8–9.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 9–10.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
MOVE OUT BY SATURDAY NOON AUGUST 25TH
OR BE MOVED

Over the next few weeks nativists and their minions flooded Japanese farms, bombed Japanese homes, pushed pick-ups owned by Japanese farmers into irrigation canals, and fired shots at Japanese farmers who tried to protect their growing crops.\(^{59}\)

A bloody catastrophe was prevented by timely intervention by the general community’s educational and religious leaders, Arizona Japanese Association lobbying efforts, and the local Japanese community’s appeals to the Japanese consulate. However, in the long run persecution was halted by economic pragmatism: the Mitsubishi Company, a large Southwest cotton purchaser, warned that the price of persisting violence against Japanese farmers would be the loss of cotton contracts; the U.S. government also made it clear that federal water projects for Arizona would be put at risk should the maltreatment of Japanese farmers continue. But the damage had already been done. “While few Japanese farmers actually left the valley as a direct result of violence,” concludes Walz, “discrimination and depression reduced their numbers in Arizona from 121 in 1930 to 52 by 1940.”\(^{60}\)

In prewar Arizona’s towns and cities there also existed racist feelings toward Nikkei (as well as other people of color) which had hardened into customs and institutional practices. Susie Sato, an Arizona native reared in Lehi, a small Mormon community in the central part of the state, has testified that while the kindness of Mormon neighbors mitigated prejudice against her Nikkei family, she encountered discrimination at movie theaters and swimming pools in the municipalities surrounding her hometown. Nikkei, along with other Asian Americans, Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Native Americans, “were not permitted to swim in the Tempe public pool, and throughout the [towns of the] Phoenix area, movie theaters practiced a strict policy of segregation.”\(^{61}\)

The Japanese Arizona World War II experience has been assayed by two historians, both working at Arizona universities: Charles Ynfante at Northern Arizona University and Andrew Russell at Arizona State University. Their work on this topic has in common the fact that both consider it within the context of Arizona’s overall home-front experience during World War II.\(^{62}\) Russell’s article in *Arizona Goes to War: The Home Front and the Front Lines during World War II*, co-edited by Brad Melton and Dean Smith, is not very compatible with the celebratory tenor of the anthology. Smith, for example, observes that World War II “brought about amazing changes in Arizona’s economy,” and he suggests that these changes were matched by Arizona’s “improvement in race relations.” To support his contention, he does not emphasize changes occurring during or immediately after the war, instead

\(^{59}\) Ibid., pp. 10-11.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 12.


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focusing on ones that, while catalyzed by the war, did not materialize until later in the postwar period.61 “Even the Japanese Americans,” contends Smith, “[who were] vilified after Pearl Harbor and herded into relocation centers, gained new acceptance after the war as Arizonans increasingly embraced the ideal of cultural diversity.”64 While Russell’s narrative and sidebars are not without some triumphalism, he does not shield readers from the darker aspects of the wartime exclusion and detention experience in Arizona. Thus, at one point, he writes:

Within a few short weeks [after Pearl Harbor] the climate of tolerance evaporated [in Arizona]. By March of 1942 the southern half of Arizona (including much of Maricopa County) became part of the huge military zone from which all Japanese Americans were to be evacuated. Military planners at the headquarters of the WDC [Western Defense Command] ultimately drew the exclusion line that cut across Arizona, but Arizona forces probably played a significant role in the shaping of evacuation policy within the state. Considering the high levels of anti-Japanese antagonism that had surfaced during the Salt River War [in 1934], it is not difficult to imagine that some Arizonans would have jumped at an excuse to finally rid the valley of Japanese farmers. Governor [Sidney P.] Osborne’s collected papers and state newspapers bear witness to the steady growth of anti-Japanese sentiment in wartime Arizona.65

Russell indicates, too, how the Arizona press barely even paid attention to the U.S. government-sited concentration camps in Arizona for incarcerating Nikkei.66 When newspapers did write about the Japanese they “tended to be negative,” as headlines such as “[Gila] River’s Japs Take 600 Jobs” and “[Officials] Forbid Japs to Leave Camps Lest Hostile Acts Occur” confirm. Russell also describes specific developments about the Nikkei presence in wartime Arizona that incited negative press coverage.67 Finally, he floats this mordant note: “Japanese Arizonans can recount few if any pleasant memories of World War II.”68

As for Charles Ynfante’s study of World War II Arizona, it tests historian Gerald Nash’s thesis that the war transformed the western region into a modern economy by applying it to a western state Nash largely neglects in

63 Smith cites, for example, a desire by Native Americans to “broaden their horizons” and the breakdown of segregation for African Americans and Mexican Americans (along with Raul Castro’s 1974 gubernatorial election). In 1962, the United States Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), which five years earlier Congress had established “to document disparities in the rights, laws, and social experiences of those deprived of rights and legal recourse as a result of race, color, religion, or national origin,” made Phoenix its first urban metropolis study site, “because of its tremendous growth, the diversity of its minority groups, and because it is a city where there are few, if any, antidiscrimination laws, and where progress in the realization of civil rights has reportedly been made.” However, after hearings held in Phoenix, the USCCR discovered that Arizona’s largest city, whose population had exploded from 65,000 to 440,000 between 1940 and 1960, and contained a modest “Oriental” and “Indian” population, a substantial number of “Negroes,” and a large, rapidly growing “Mexican American” community, had as late as the 1950s segregated schools, theaters, and even many restaurants—sometimes with the force of law. See Tom I. Romero, “Of Race and Rights: Legal Culture, Social Change, and the Making of a Multicultural Metropolis, Denver 1940-1975” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2004), pp. 253-55, which compares the findings of the USCCR in Denver with those in other western urban centers such as Phoenix.

64 Dean Smith, “Conclusion,” in Melton and Smith, Arizona Goes to War, 178-79.

65 Russell, “Arizona Divided,” pp. 44. 46.

66 Arizona’s detention facilities included Mayer Assembly Center, Poston and Gila River Relocation Centers, Leupp Isolation Center, and Catalina Federal Honor Camp, which collectively imprisoned upward of 35,000 Nikkei, far more than in any other Interior West state during World War II.

67 Specific developments mentioned by Russell include the following: when a profit-making cooperative at the Gila River camp was established in 1942; when the War Relocation Authority [WRA] instituted a policy allowing those behind barbed wires to accept temporary jobs or long-term employment outside the military zone (especially in the Intermountain states); when, in mid-summer 1943, “a team of army investigators from WDC had to travel to Phoenix . . . because some Arizonans had blamed ‘Japanese sabotage’ for fires that consumed two produce-packing sheds”; and when, in 1944, the federal government lifted West Coast exclusion orders and announced the imminent closing of the WRA camps, thereby causing “renewed concerns that the camp populations might try to settle in Arizona.”

68 Ibid., 53-55.
his scholarship—Arizona. Additionally, Ynfante explores the wartime experiences of Native Americans, African, Americans, Japanese Americans, and Mexican nationals (but not Mexican Americans) to determine whether Nash is right in judging World War II a watershed for Arizona’s racial-ethnic minorities. While conceding that Nash is correct in concluding that Arizona experienced a major turning point economically during and after the war, Ynfante enters this caveat:

At the same time, Arizona’s dominant Anglo society was generally racist toward its resident minority groups. Perhaps Nash should have made further inquiry into the social experiences of this southwestern state before making his optimistic assessment about the war’s impact upon minority groups in western society. Had he done so, he would have found that Arizona was laggard in improving its own racial relations. Arizona is as vital a state as any in the western region. Its experiences deserve exploration that penetrates deeper than Nash’s general assessment.20

Ynfante’s closing words nicely lend themselves to appropriation and reapplication here. Directly put, they can be used to support the argument that the Interior West experience of Japanese Americans is as vital as that for any other region of the United States, and that it deserves a much deeper exploration by dedicated students of Nikkei history, society, and culture than it has received to date.

This essay has thus far examined how scholars from varying disciplines have, in recent years, supported a deeper exploration of the Interior West Nikkei experience from pioneering days through World War II. Let us now briefly explore recent scholarship pertaining to the post-World War II experience of Interior West Nikkei. A strategic starting point is a 2006 study done by Joel Tadao Miyasaki.21 The larger and direct concern of Miyasaki—who describes himself as “the son of a Japanese American father and a white mother”—is Nikkei identity in Utah and Idaho during the World War II exclusion and detention experience of Japanese Americans (and, indirectly, for Nikkei generally in the period since World War II).22

Miyasaki’s study has a three-part theoretical base: first, it draws on a concept from sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant, that “historical circumstances influence the process of ‘racialization,’ the creation of racial identity [and that] this identity in turn affects the way that historical actors live and make decisions within any particular moment in time”; second, it explores the idea from historian George Sánchez, “that cultural adaptation affects identity [which] occurs when ethnic groups encounter the dominating influence of white society”; and third, it examines the concept, put forth by historian Lisbeth Haas, that “history occurs both in time and space [and] power relationships [are] formed by different groups as they enter a particular space and attempt to manipulate that space for their own purposes.”23

70 Ynfante, “Arizona during the Second World War,” p. 317; for Ynfante’s evaluation of the Japanese American experience in World War II Arizona, see Chapter 8, pp. 208-39, in which he baldly states that “the legacy of Japanese internment is deplorable” (p. 232).
72 Miyasaki’s specific interest is with the area extending southward from Rexburg in southeastern Idaho to Price in northern Utah.
Miyasaki uses this conceptual framework to illuminate the World War II story of the “small, but influential” and “largely ignored” Japanese American population in Utah and Idaho, who “found themselves dispersed inside a largely white, Mormon population.” He then concludes that, in general, “these regional circumstances created a much different communal identity” from that constructed by West Coast Nikkei, and in particular, that the relative “freedom” Interior West Japanese Americans had during World War II (together with the wartime prejudice in their region) “created a discourse of self-preservation among Utah’s and Idaho’s Nikkei [and] the spirit of survival found its way into the JACL’s [Japanese American Citizens League] wartime policies and [thereby] consequently affected the United States’ larger Japanese American population in real and tragic ways.”

Miyasaki argues that not only have scholars showed a preoccupation with World War II politics and prejudice, but also that traditional Japanese American historical scholarship has been “California-centric.” As a result, the wartime experience of Utah and Idaho—Interior West states in the “Free Zone”—has been woefully slighted. Still, recent work on the Nikkei experience, especially that stimulated by oral history interviewing, has placed a premium on first-person perspectives; this work has provided Japanese Americans in the Interior West a chance to examine “how they participated in the creation and absorption of culture.” This, in turn, has allowed studies like “Claiming a Place in the Intermountain West” to at long last “find a home and [gain] a sense of importance.”

The heart of Miyasaki’s study is its fourth chapter, entitled “A Discourse of Survival.” Therein, Miyasaki maintains that the two Utah-based Japanese vernacular newspapers— the Utah Nippo and the Pacific Citizen—progressively sounded a chauvinistic message reflecting a “discourse of good citizenship.” (The Utah Nippo had an English-language section edited by Mike Masaoka, a Mormon convert; just before the outbreak of World War II he became national secretary and field executive for the Japanese American Citizens League, the organization recognized by the U.S. government as the Nikkei community’s “voice.” The Pacific Citizen was the JACL’s newspaper, and during the war it relocated, along with the organization’s national leadership, from San Francisco to Salt Lake City.) Convinced that for Nikkei to “survive” in Utah and Idaho they needed, at all costs, to preserve the American way of life, Sunao Ishio—Masaoka’s successor as Utah Nippo’s English-language section successor—trumpeted this uncritical patriotic anthem on October 8, 1941: “Let there not be found within the Japanese American Community one to criticize the course set by the people of the United States.”

Ishio’s verbal flag-waving, as Miyasaki explains, foreshadowed “the policy the JACL and its allies would use in the months and years after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.” Moreover, because the national JACL increasingly relied on those chapters constituting the organization’s newly organized Intermountain District Council for membership and funding support during the war, the “local” survival discourse of

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76 Ibid., iii-iv.
77 Ibid., 4.
78 Ibid., pp. 68-69. The gold standard for the articulation of the JACL’s discourse of citizenship was achieved the previous year by Mike Masaoka in his widely circulated “Japanese-American Creed” (for this creed, see ibid., p. 67). By way of prefacing it, Miyasaki notes that Masaoka’s creed “represents his feelings as an intermountain Nisei” and characterizes it as “the first written manifestation of the policies the JACL supported during World War II.” Miyasaki alludes to precursors to this brand of nationalistic boosterism in Utah, such as the Rei Nei Magazine; this periodical was published in the 1920s in Salt Lake City explicitly to “promote patriotism,” and the existence of an informal Salt Lake City-based organization in the 1930s, the Rei Nei Kwai, that “often found ways to perform . . . patriotic fervor” (ibid., pp. 63-64).
79 Ibid., p. 69.
80 Ibid., p. 89.
81 Ibid., p. 72.
militant Americanism increasingly reverberated in the public philosophy espoused by national JACL leaders and within the pages of both the Utah Nippo and the Pacific Citizen.

These two newspapers, along with two Denver-based vernaculars, the Colorado Times [Kakushu Jiji] and the Rocky Shimpo [Rocky Jiho], were all “authorized” by the U.S. government to serve as the “free” Japanese American wartime press, and they substantially enlarged their print runs to serve the expanded Nikkei readership within the concentration camp and resettlement populations. Responding to government subsidization (and a fear of being forced by the government to suspend operations), the Utah Nippo and Colorado Times English-language sections intensified their prewar editorial policy espousing a muscular Americanism, and in so doing they complemented—and, arguably, deepened—the all-English Pacific Citizen’s nationalistic message and tone.\(^82\)

As interpreted by Miyasaki, the content and tenor of both the JACL and the vernacular press led to Japanese Americans feeling as if they had to fit into American society in a nonthreatening way: they had to work harder than whites, maintain low profiles, fully support government actions, personify the idea of “blood assimilation” through risking and even losing their lives on the battlefields of America’s wars, and privilege “playing American” over protecting civil liberties and individual rights.\(^83\) According to an influential theory postulated by historian Gary Okihiro, this situation represents a quintessential example whereby the mainstream (in this case, the national Japanese American community) was transformed through the ideas and actions occurring on one of its margins (in this instance, the regional Nikkei community of the Intermountain West).\(^84\)

In his study of World War II Nevada, Andrew Russell contends that “few scholars have looked east of California at Japanese-American life, history and wartime experiences outside the camps.”\(^85\) He suggests that this neglect of the Interior West states, where some 12,000 to 14,000 Japanese Americans (one-tenth of the pre-World War II Nikkei population) lived prior to and just after Pearl Harbor, “represents a large gap in history.” In his opinion, this gap represents a serious problem, not simply because “historical significance of a group is not determined strictly by its size,” but also because information about the general Japanese American experience provides a master “mainstream” narrative to which are bound the stories and struggles of the “marginal” Interior West region. Russell reveals his indebtedness to Okihiro’s work in the observation that if “great lessons for mainstream America have emerged from the study of how Japanese Americans were victimized and how they protested these transgressions of justice during and after the war,” so too can “the images and experiences of Japanese Americans that emerged and evolved beyond the West Coast and the barbed-wire parameters of the camps . . . shed additional light on experiences of the ethnic mainstream, on the attitudes and actions of the larger American mainstream, and, most importantly, on the historic margins and mainstreams of interior states like Nevada.”\(^86\) Thus, a searching examination of both “the historic margins and mainstreams” is crucial to achieve the broadest and deepest understanding of the Japanese American experience.

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\(^{82}\) For a critical assessment of the Japanese American press during World War II, see Takeya Mizuno, “The Civil Libertarian Press, the Japanese American Press, and Japanese American Mass Evacuation” (PhD diss., University of Missouri, 2000). The situation of the Rocky Shimpo’s English-language edition, particularly during the January-April 1944 editorship of James Omura, which featured editorial support for the organized Nisei draft resistance at the Heart Mountain concentration camp, was different from these other three papers both in its greater emphasis upon civil liberties and social justice and its independence from and even spirited opposition to the JACL. However, after the U.S. government, encouraged by the JACL leadership, forced Omura out of his editorship and replaced him with JACL stalwart Roy Takeno, the Rocky Shimpo’s English-language section was in editorial accord with its three Interior West counterparts.

\(^{83}\) See Miyasaki, “Claiming a Place in the Intermountain West,” pp. 71-72, 86, and 89.


\(^{86}\) Ibid., pp. 129-30.
In order for scholarship to continue in this area, the present wealth of studies pertaining to the mainstream Japanese American experience before, during, and after World War II must be supplemented by a proliferation of published—and thus readily accessible—work centering on the Interior West Nikkei experience. While a good start has been made by the appearance in print of some of the books and articles referred to in this essay, a next step must be to convert a selected number of currently unpublished book-length manuscripts cited in this essay. Readers are encouraged to go beyond the select secondary sources cited in this essay to explore some of those not mentioned but nonetheless pertinent and readily obtainable, along with the abundant (if more ephemeral) virtual

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